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Abstract 
 
We use a panel of over 120,000 Chinese firms of different ownership types over the period 
2000-2007 to analyze the linkages between investment in fixed and working capital and 
financing constraints. We find that those firms characterized by high working capital display 
high sensitivities of investment in working capital to cash flow (WKS) and low sensitivities of 
investment in fixed capital to cash flow (FKS). We then construct and analyze firm-level FKS 
and WKS measures and find that, despite severe external financing constraints, those firms 
with low FKS and high WKS exhibit the highest fixed investment rates. This suggests that 
good working capital management may help firms to alleviate the effects of financing 
constraints on fixed investment.  
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1. Introduction 
In the last three decades, the Chinese economy has been characterized by persistently high 
fixed investment rates and phenomenal growth rates (Song et al., 2010)
1
. Yet, considering 
that the Chinese financial system is poorly developed, this can been seen as a puzzle (Allen et 
al., 2005). Several authors have tried to find explanations for this puzzle. Among these, 
Ayaggari et al. (2010) focus on the role of informal finance, and conclude that it is not 
because of their access to informal financial sources that Chinese firms were able to grow, 
despite limited access to external finance. Cull et al. (2009) conclude that access to trade 
credit did not play a significant role in explaining the puzzle. Guariglia et al. (2011) 
demonstrate that the Chinese growth miracle was driven by the highly productive private 
firms, which were able to accumulate very high cash flows. According to their study, it is 
thanks to this abundant internal finance that Chinese private firms managed to finance their 
high growth rates despite their limited ability to obtain external finance.  
In this paper, we focus on investment in fixed capital, which is a significant 
determinant of growth, both generally (Bernanke and Gurkaynak, 2001; Bond and 
Schiantarelli, 2004) and in China (Ding and Knight, 2009, 2010)
2
. Specifically, we explore 
the role played by working capital management in explaining why Chinese firms were able to 
invest at very high rates despite significant financing constraints. Working capital is defined 
as the difference between current assets and current liabilities, and is often taken to be a 
measure of liquidity. We chose to focus on working capital management - motivated by the 
observation that, over the period 2000-2007, the Chinese firms in our dataset were 
characterized by a very high average ratio of working capital to fixed capital (66.6%). 
Considering that working capital is highly reversible, and that firms can easily adjust it 
(Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Carpenter et al., 1994), our aim is to investigate the extent to 
which, in the presence of fluctuations in cash flow, Chinese firms are able to adjust their 
working capital instead of their fixed capital investment, therefore alleviating the effects of 
cash flow shocks on the latter. Our analysis is related to Fazzari and Petersen (1993) who 
conduct a similar investigation on US firms, and find that these firms are indeed able to 
                                                 
1
 According to our dataset, which is fully described in section 3, over the more recent period covering the years 
2000-2007, Chinese firms were characterized by  an average total assets growth rate of 9%, sales growth rate of 
11.6%, and fixed investment to capital ratio of 8.6%.  
2
 The fact that there is a positive association between high fixed investment and high growth is supported by our 
data, according to which those firms whose fixed investment rate falls in the top quartile of the distribution of 
the fixed investment rates of all firms in the sample, exhibit an assets growth rate of 20.46% and a sales growth 
rate of 18.60%, while the corresponding figures for those firms whose fixed investment rate falls in the bottom 
quartile of the distribution are -2.51% and 4.58%. 
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smooth fixed investment with working capital. To the best of our knowledge, no such 
investigation has been undertaken for a developing country. We fill this gap in the literature, 
focusing on the Chinese case.  
Our study is based on a panel of 121,237 firms over the period 2000-2007. We 
initially run standard fixed investment regressions as a function of cash flow, separately for 
state- owned enterprises (SOEs), foreign, private, and collective enterprises. We find that the 
former always exhibit poorly determined sensitivities of fixed investment to cash flow, 
suggesting that SOEs are not financially constrained. This can be explained by these firms‟ 
needs to fulfil political and social objectives as well as economic objectives (Bai et al., 2006) 
and the priority that central and local governments and the (predominant) state-owned banks 
accord to them. On the other hand, all other groups of firms exhibit high sensitivities of fixed 
investment to cash flow, which suggests that they suffer from significant liquidity constraints. 
Moreover, all firms with the exception of SOEs exhibit significant sensitivities of working 
capital investment to cash flow. These findings indicate that, in the presence of fluctuations in 
cash flow, firms tend to adjust both their fixed and working capital investment. Yet, when we 
differentiate firms into those with a relatively high and a relatively low working capital to 
fixed capital ratio, we find that, in the presence of cash flow shocks, it is only those firms 
with a high ratio that are able to adjust their working capital investment. Furthermore, for all 
but foreign firms, the sensitivity of fixed capital investment to cash flow is much lower for 
those firms with high working capital: these may therefore use their working capital to 
alleviate the effects of cash flow shocks on their fixed capital investment. 
We then construct firm-level sensitivities of investment in fixed and working capital 
to cash flow (FKS and WKS respectively) and analyze their determinants. To the best of our 
knowledge, no other study in the literature has analyzed the links between investment in fixed 
capital, working capital, and financing constraints by making use of firm-level sensitivities. 
This represents our second contribution. We find that in the presence of cash flow shocks, 
older, larger, and slow-growing firms typically adjust fixed capital investment, while smaller, 
younger, and fast-growing firms are able to adjust working capital instead. Furthermore, 
firms with low cash flow, which are likely to face significant internal credit constraints, are 
particularly active in adjusting both their fixed and working capital investment, while highly 
leveraged firms with low collateral tend to adjust the latter more than the former. Combining 
the two sensitivities, we find that, compared to the other groups, those firms with low FKS 
and high WKS are more externally financially constrained (being younger, smaller, more 
indebted, and less collateralized), have high investment opportunities (exemplified by their 
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high sales growth rates), and high working capital. Yet, they also have the highest fixed 
investment to fixed capital ratios. Despite the financing constraints that they face, in the 
presence of adverse cash flow shocks, these firms can maintain high fixed investment levels 
by adjusting working capital more than fixed capital. It is therefore possible that, although 
they face severe financial constraints, Chinese firms are able to maintain high fixed 
investment and growth rates by effectively managing their working capital. In addition to the 
ability to accumulate high cash flows highlighted in Guariglia et al. (2011), good working 
capital management may contribute to the explanation for the Chinese growth puzzle. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some 
background about working capital management and its importance in the Chinese context. 
Section 3 describes our data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 illustrates our 
baseline specification and estimation methodology. Section 5 presents our main empirical 
results, and section 6 our analysis of firm-level sensitivities of fixed and working capital 
investment to cash flow. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Working capital management and its importance in the Chinese context 
Working capital is defined as the difference between firms‟ current assets (which include 
accounts receivable, inventories, and cash) and current liabilities (which include accounts 
payable and short term debt). It represents the source and use of short-term capital. It is also 
often used to measure a firm‟s liquidity. Liquidity is a precondition to ensure that firms are 
able to meet their short-term obligations. Insufficient liquidity can lead to bankruptcy (Dunn 
and Cheatham, 1993). Yet, too much liquidity can be detrimental to firms‟ profitability 
(Bhattacharya, 2001). Good management of working capital therefore requires striking a 
balance between liquidity and profitability in order to maximize the value of the firm. 
Specifically, holding large inventory stocks enables firms to avoid interruptions in the 
production process and costly stock-outs
3
. Moreover, granting trade credit to one‟s clients can 
stimulate sales, as it enables customers to verify the quality of the product before paying for 
it, and as it represents an additional source of credit for them (Long at al., 1993; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997). Yet, the higher are inventories and trade credit, the less money is available to 
the firm for profitable investment, which suggests that finding the optimal level of working 
capital may be a difficult task for firm managers (Deloof, 2003). Working capital 
management is particularly important in the Chinese context, where firms have limited access 
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 A stock-out is defined as a situation in which the demand for a product cannot be fulfilled from the current 
inventory. 
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to long-term capital markets
4
. Such firms therefore need to rely on internally generated funds, 
short-term bank loans, and trade credit to finance investment in inventories, cash, and 
accounts receivables. It is important to note that working capital is negative in 40% of the 
firm-year observations in our sample, which suggests that firms use working capital as an 
additional source of finance. 
Another advantage of working capital, highlighted by Fazzari and Petersen (1993), is 
that it enables firms to smooth their fixed capital investment in the presence of cash flow 
shocks. As fixed capital investment is characterized by high adjustment costs, firms benefit 
from having smooth fixed investment. In the presence of negative cash flow shocks and 
financing constraints, it is mainly those firms which have sufficiently high levels of working 
capital that can absorb the shocks without having to reduce their fixed investment. Once 
again, because most Chinese firms are financially constrained, good working capital 
management may be particularly important for them to maintain relatively high and smooth 
levels of fixed investment. Good working capital management could therefore be an 
important mechanism through which Chinese firms cope with financing constraints. In the 
sections that follow, we verify whether or not this is the case. 
   
3.  Data and summary statistics 
3.1 Data 
Our data are drawn from the annual accounting reports filed by industrial firms with the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) over the period 2000-2007. All state-owned enterprises 
and other types of enterprises with annual sales of five million yuan (about $650,000) or 
more are covered. These firms operate in the manufacturing and mining sectors and are in 31 
provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities. Observations with negative sales, negative 
total assets minus total fixed assets, negative total assets minus liquid assets; and negative 
accumulated depreciation minus current depreciation, were dropped. We also eliminated 
firms that did not have complete records on our main regression variables. To control for the 
potential influence of outliers, we deleted observations in the one percent tails of each of the 
regression variables. Finally, we dropped all firms with less than five years of consecutive 
observations. Our final panel covers 121,237 mainly unlisted firms, which corresponds to 
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 55% of the firm-year observations in our dataset do not have access to long-term debt.  
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790,229 firm-year observations
5
. It is unbalanced, with the number of observations ranging 
from a minimum of 60,341 in 2000 to a maximum of 116,053 in 2003
6
. 
 The NBS data contain a continuous measure of ownership, which is based on the 
fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by the following types of investors: the state; foreign 
investors (excluding those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan); investors from Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; legal entities; individuals; and collective investors. The rationale 
for dividing foreign investors into those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and those 
from other parts of the world is that the former capture the so-called “round-tripping” foreign 
direct investment, whereby domestic firms may register as foreign invested firms from 
nearby regions to take advantage of the benefits (such as tax and legal benefits) granted to 
foreign invested firms (Huang, 2003). Ownership by legal entities is a mixture of ownership 
by state legal entities and private legal entities
7
, which represents a form of corporate 
ownership. Finally, collective firms are typically owned collectively by communities in urban 
or rural areas (the latter are known as Township and Village Enterprises, or TVEs) and 
managed by local governments
8
. 
We grouped all foreign-owned firms (from Hong-Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and other 
parts of the world) into a single category (which we labelled foreign) and all firms owned by 
legal entities and individuals into a single category (labelled private)
9
. We then classified our 
firms into state-owned, foreign, private, and collective, based on the shares of paid-in-capital 
contributed by the four types of investors in each year. Specifically, we classified firms 
according to majority average ownership share. For instance, we classified a firm as privately 
                                                 
5
 The Chinese NBS dataset does not allow separate identification of publicly listed companies: it is difficult to 
track these companies as their legal identification numbers were changed as they went public (Liu and Xiao, 
2004). Over the period considered, there were slightly more than 1000 listed companies operating in the 
manufacturing and mining sectors, which amount to less than 0.3% of the total number of firms in our sample. 
6
 See Appendix 1 for details about the structure of our panel, as well as for complete definitions of all variables 
used. 
7
 Legal entities represent a mix of various domestic institutions, such as industrial enterprises, construction and 
real estate development companies, transportation and power companies, securities companies, trust and 
investment companies, foundations and funds, banks, technology and research institutions, etc. 
8
 According to Abraham et al. (2010), although they used to be state-controlled, since the beginning of the 
1990s, collective firms can be considered as private firms. 
9
 Within this category, firms owned by individuals represent approximately 60% of the total. As firms owned by 
legal entities include firms owned by state legal entities, one could question their inclusion in the private 
category. One reason for including them is that while the state‟s primary interest is mainly political (i.e. aimed at 
maintaining employment levels or control over certain strategic industries), legal entities are profit-oriented 
(Wei et al., 2005). Since our dataset does not allow us to discriminate between state and non-state legal entities, 
we were unable to exclude the former from our private category.  
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owned in a given year if the share of its capital owned by private investors in that year is at 
least 50% (see Dollar and Wei, 2007; and Ayyagari et al., 2010, for a similar approach)
10
.  
 As our objective in this paper is not the study of the effects of firms‟ transitions from 
state-owned to private or foreign, in our subsequent analysis we make use of time-invariant 
measures of ownership. Hence, as in Guariglia (2011), we classify firms into our four 
ownership categories, based on majority average ownership share calculated over the sample 
period
11
. 
 
3.2 Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in our study for the four 
ownership groups. We can see that SOEs are characterized by very low fixed investment to 
fixed capital and cash flow to fixed capital ratios (2.2% and 11.8% respectively). Their 
working capital to fixed capital ratio (11.7%) and investment in working capital to fixed 
capital ratios (2.7%) are also much lower than those of other firms. Looking at the 
components of the working capital to fixed capital ratio, we see that their inventories to fixed 
capital ratio is 74.0%, whereas the ratio exceeds 100% for the other three groups. Similarly, 
the financial working capital to fixed capital ratio is negative for all groups of firms, but 
larger in absolute value for SOEs (-62.2%)
12
. Our statistics also suggest that SOEs are larger 
and older than the other groups. Their sales growth rate (2.4%) is much lower, while their 
leverage ratio (71.3%) and collateral (43.7%) are much higher. External liquidity needs, 
defined as the inventories to sales ratio, are also much higher for SOEs than for the other 
groups of firms
13
. Finally, only 43.7% of SOEs are located in coastal areas, compared to 
more than 65% for the other groups, and 33.3% of them are politically affiliated
14
, compared 
                                                 
10
 We derived ownership categories on the basis of the fraction of capital paid in by the various groups in every 
year, rather than using registration codes. Registration codes are not entirely reliable as they are updated only 
with considerable delay (Dollar and Wei, 2007). Moreover, firms might have an incentive to falsely register as 
foreign simply to take advantage of the tax benefits accorded to the latter. All our results were robust to using 
registration-based ownership categories. Note that our way of classifying firms into ownership groups excludes 
from our sample firms with mixed ownership in which no group has a majority share. For instance, a firm 
characterized by 40% private ownership, 30% state ownership, and 30% foreign ownership would be excluded. 
Firms of this type of mixed ownership make up only 1.5% of the sample. 
11
 Defining ownership categories based on majority average ownership also has the advantage of minimizing the 
effects of measurement error in the ownership variables which can affect individual years. 
12
 Financial working capital is defined as the difference between the sum of cash and equivalents and accounts 
receivable, and the sum of short term debt and accounts payable. 
13
 The inventories to sales ratio captures the fraction of inventory investment that can be financed with ongoing 
revenue. As discussed in Raddatz (2006), “a higher value of this ratio means that a smaller fraction of inventory 
investment can be financed by ongoing revenue and therefore represents a higher level of external liquidity 
needs” (p. 685). 
14
 Political affiliation is measured using a dummy variable to indicate whether the firm is affiliated (has a lishu 
relationship) with the central or provincial government (Li, 2004; Tan et al., 2007; Xia et al., 2009). A lishu 
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to less than 4% for the other categories. In summary, these statistics indicate that SOEs are 
quite different from the other three groups of firms.  
Focusing on the remaining three ownership groups, the fixed investment to fixed 
capital ratio ranges from 6.2% for collective firms to 9.8% for private firms. The cash flow to 
fixed capital ratio ranges from 37.2% for private firms to 43.9% for collective firms. Foreign 
firms have the highest working capital to fixed capital ratio and the highest investment in 
working capital to fixed capital ratio. The working capital to fixed capital ratio ranges from 
56.7% for private firms to 116.7% for foreign firms, and the investment in working capital to 
fixed capital ratio, from 10.9% for private firms to 17.7% for foreign firms. 
Consider the components of working capital: foreign firms exhibit the highest 
inventories to fixed capital ratio (127.4%) and the highest financial working capital to fixed 
capital ratio (-10.7%). The high inventories to fixed capital ratios characterizing foreign firms 
can be explained by the fact that many foreign firms in China conduct import-processing 
business, i.e. they import raw materials and intermediary goods for processing and export the 
final products. These firms therefore hold very high stocks of inventories, and these are part 
of the current assets component of working capital. It is interesting that 94.3% of foreign 
firms are located in the coastal area. 
Private firms display the highest sales growth rate (13.7%) and the highest fixed 
investment to fixed capital ratio (9.8%). They also have the lowest inventories to sales ratio 
(21.8%), which suggests that they have relatively low external liquidity needs. This is 
consistent with Guariglia et al. (2011), according to which private firms in China have been 
able to grow at spectacular rates in recent years despite the financing constraints that they 
face, because they have been able to accumulate very high levels of cash flow. 73.2% of the 
private firms in our sample are located in the coastal region. As for the collective firms, they 
have the highest cash flow to fixed capital ratio (43.9%), and are the smallest in terms of real 
assets (424,000 yuan). They are also older than their private and foreign counterparts and 
have a slightly lower sales growth (7.9%). 68.8% of these firms are located in the coastal 
region. 
For all groups of firms with the exception of SOEs, the standard deviation of the fixed 
investment to fixed capital ratio is less than the standard deviation of the cash flow to fixed 
capital ratio, which is in turn less than the standard deviation of the working capital 
investment to fixed capital ratio (see figures in square brackets in Table 1). Furthermore, for 
                                                                                                                                                        
relationship is associated with government support and subsidies. In particular, governments can grant firms 
affiliated with them benefits such as bank loans at better conditions, waivers of import tariffs, tax reductions etc. 
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all groups of firms, the standard deviation of the investment in working capital to fixed 
capital ratio is between 3.9 and 5.7 times higher than that of the fixed investment to fixed 
capital ratio. This can be seen as confirmation that it is easier and cheaper for firms to adjust 
their working capital than their fixed capital, and as preliminary evidence in favor of the view 
that firms use working capital to smooth fixed investment in the presence of fluctuations in 
cash flow
15
.  
Our data also suggest that for all ownership groups, high fixed capital investment is 
associated with more stable fixed investment (see figures in curly brackets in Table 1). A 
cross-sectional regression of firms‟ fixed investment to fixed capital ratios on the standard 
deviation of this ratio, controlling for industry and provincial effects, shows a negative and 
highly significant coefficient on the standard deviation term. Although this regression does 
not provide evidence of causality, it indicates that more stable fixed investment is associated 
with higher fixed investment
16
. Finally, a higher fixed capital investment is also associated 
with a higher total assets growth (see figures in double curly brackets in Table 1)
17
.  
 
4. Baseline specifications and estimation methodology 
 
4.1 Baseline specifications 
 
We initially estimate a fixed investment equation of the following type: 
 
(Iit/Kit) = a0 + a1(CFit/Kit) + vi + vt + vjt+ eit       (1) 
 
where Iit denotes  firm i‟s fixed investment at time t; Kit, its fixed capital stock; and  CFit, its 
cash flow
18
. The error term in Equation (1) comprises a firm-specific time-invariant 
component (vi), encompassing all time-invariant firm characteristics likely to influence fixed 
investment, as well as the time-invariant component of the measurement error affecting any 
of the regression variables; a time-specific component (vt) accounting for possible business 
cycle effects; an industry-specific time-specific component (vjt), which accounts for industry-
                                                 
15
 In our full sample, working capital investment is negative in over 44% of the observations. This can be seen 
as further evidence that working capital is a highly reversible asset which firms can use to smooth out cash flow 
fluctuations.  
16
 For brevity, the results of this regression are not reported but are available from the authors upon request. 
17
 We report total assets growth for consistency with Guariglia et al. (2011). Similar trends (not reported) were 
observed for real sales growth. 
18
 We estimate a static instead of a dynamic model because the specification tests described in section 4.2 tended 
to reject the latter.  
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specific business cycle effects; and an idiosyncratic component (eit). We control for the firm-
specific time-invariant component of the error term by estimating our equation in first-
differences, for the time-specific component by including time dummies in all our 
specifications, and for the industry-specific time-specific component by including time 
dummies interacted with industry dummies.  
As firms in our sample are not listed on the stock market, we are unable to include 
Tobin‟s Q in the regression to control for investment opportunities. Instead, we control for 
the latter by including time dummies interacted with industry dummies. This approach can be 
seen as an indirect way of accounting for investment opportunities, or more general demand 
factors, as the dummies account for all time-varying demand shocks at the industry level 
(Brown et al., 2009; Duchin et al., 2010; Guariglia et al., 2011)
19
. 
The cash flow coefficient a1 can be interpreted as an indicator of the degree of 
financing constraints faced by firms. In the presence of a drop in cash flow, a financially 
constrained firm will in fact be forced to reduce or postpone its fixed investment. We 
estimate Equation (1) separately for our four ownership groups, with the aim of assessing 
whether ownership affects the degree of financing constraints faced by firms. We expect 
SOEs to be the least constrained firms as they are likely to benefit from soft budget 
constraints and favoritism from the state-owned banks. On the other hand, private firms are 
expected to be the most constrained as banks are generally reluctant to lend to them. 
 As working capital is typically characterized by lower adjustment costs than 
investment in fixed capital (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Carpenter et al., 1994), firms should 
find it easier and cheaper to adjust the latter instead of the former in the presence of 
fluctuations in cash flow. This strategy should enable them to keep fixed investment high and 
relatively smooth. To test whether this is the case, we next estimate an equation of investment 
in working capital (IWKit) as a function of cash flow. The equation takes the following form: 
 
(IWKit/Kit) = b0 +b1(CFit/Kit) +  vi + vt + vjt+ eit      (2) 
 
In the presence of smoothing we would expect to see a high sensitivity of investment in 
working capital to cash flow, i.e. a large b1 coefficient. 
                                                 
19
 All our results were robust to including sales growth in addition or in place of the industry-specific time 
dummies, to control for investment opportunities. It is noteworthy that according to D‟Espallier and Guariglia 
(2009), the investment opportunity bias is not a serious problem for unlisted firms. Using a panel of Belgian 
firms, they find that the fixed investment-cash flow sensitivities remain basically unchanged when different 
measures of investment opportunities are used. 
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The extent to which working capital can be adjusted in the presence of fluctuations in 
cash flow depends on the amount of working capital the firm has at hand. Firms can be 
expected to optimize their working capital by equating the marginal benefit and the marginal 
cost of holding working capital. If firms that are more financially constrained have a higher 
marginal cost, they may choose a lower level of working capital, ceteris paribus, and have a 
higher marginal benefit. Yet, if firms include among the benefits the ability to adjust working 
capital in response to cash flow shocks, firms with high adjustment costs of varying fixed 
investment may choose to hold more working capital. On that basis, firms with less working 
capital may be less able or less willing to reduce their working capital in order to smooth 
fixed investment in the face of cash flow shocks (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Carpenter et al., 
1994)
20
. In order to take this into account, we differentiate the cash flow effect in the working 
capital regression across firms with relatively high and low working capital. This leads to the 
following equation:  
 
 (IWKit /Kit) = b0 + b11(CFit/Ki(t-1))*LOWWKit+ b12(CFit/Ki(t-1))*HIGHWKit +  
 
+vi + vt + vjt+ eit        (3) 
 
where LOWWK (HIGHWK) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i‟s working capital to 
fixed capital ratio at time t is in the bottom (top) half of the distribution of the working capital 
of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i at time t, and 0 otherwise
21
.  
We differentiate the cash flow effect in a similar way in our fixed investment 
regression:  
 
(Iit/Kit) = a0 + a11(CFit/Ki(t-1))*LOWWKit+ a12(CFit/Ki(t-1))*HIGHWKit + vi + vt + vjt+ eit (4) 
 
If firms are able to smooth fixed investment using working capital, then this effect is 
supposed to be larger for firms with large working capital. Hence, we would expect the 
sensitivity of working capital investment to cash flow to be higher for firms with large 
working capital. Consequently, for those firms able to smooth cash flow fluctuations with 
changes in working capital, the sensitivity of fixed capital investment to cash flow should be 
lower. The cash flow coefficient for firms with high working capital should be higher than 
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 A low level of financial working capital and inventories would respectively lead to a low level of liquidity and 
a high probability of costly stock-outs, which would both make it difficult for the firm to maintain smooth 
operations. 
21
 The LOWWK and HIGHWK dummy variables are constructed separately for each of our four ownership 
groups. 
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that for their counterparts with low working capital in equation (3), while we should observe 
the opposite in equation (4). In other words, if b12 were larger than b11 in equation (3), but a11 
were larger than a12 in equation (4), then we could deduce that firms are able to smooth fixed 
capital investment using working capital. Accumulating high working capital could hence be 
seen as an effective strategy to mitigate the severity of financing constraints. 
 
 
4.2 Estimation methodology 
We estimate all our equations using a first-difference Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) approach (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The use of first-differencing controls for firm-
specific, time-invariant effects. Lagged values of the regressors are used as instruments to 
control for the possible endogeneity of regressors.  
To assess whether our instruments are legitimate and our model is correctly specified, 
we check whether the variables in our instrument set are uncorrelated with the error term in 
the relevant equation, making use of two tests. The first is the Sargan test (also known as J 
test) for overidentifying restrictions. Under the null of instrument validity, this test is 
asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
instruments less the number of parameters
22
.  
Our second test is based on the serial correlation in the differenced residuals. We 
assess the presence of n
th
-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals using the m(n) 
test, which is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no n
th
-order 
serial correlation of the differenced residuals. In the presence of serial correlation of order n 
in the differenced residuals, the instrument set needs to be restricted to lags n+1 and deeper. 
The latter instruments are valid in the absence of serial correlation of order n+1 in the 
differenced residuals (Brown and Petersen, 2009; Roodman, 2006).  
We initially used our regressors lagged twice as instruments. Since the Sargan test 
and/or the test for second order autocorrelation of the differenced residuals systematically 
failed, we lagged all our instruments three times. In all the tables, we therefore report the test 
for third order autocorrelation of the differenced residuals
23
. 
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 It should be noted that when samples with a very large cross-sectional dimension are used in estimation, the 
Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions tends to over-reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity 
(Blundell et al., 2000; Benito, 2003; Guariglia et al., 2011). 
 
23
 All tables report the m1 test for first-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals. Considering that our 
equations are estimated in first-differences, in most cases we find evidence of significant negative first-order 
serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Note that neither the J test nor the test for n-th order serial 
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5. Main empirical tests 
We initially estimate equation (1) for our four ownership groups. The results are reported in 
Table 2. In line with the literature (Chow and Fung, 1998, 2000; Héricourt and Poncet, 2009; 
Poncet et al., 2010; Guariglia et al., 2011), we find that fixed investment at SOEs is not 
sensitive to cash flow. This suggests that these firms benefit from soft budget constraints or 
favorable treatment from banks. On the other hand, foreign, private, and collective firms all 
display positive and precisely determined cash flow coefficients. These are the largest for 
private (0.4) and collective firms (0.3), which are likely to be the most financially constrained 
groups as state-owned banks typically discriminate against them (Allen et al., 2005). The 
cash flow elasticities evaluated at sample medians are respectively 0.68, 0.97, and 1.18 for 
foreign, private, and collective firms. Neither the Sargan test nor the test for third order 
autocorrelation of the differenced residuals indicates any problems with the validity of our 
instruments or the specification of the model. 
 We then estimate equation (2) and report the results in Table 3. With the exception of 
SOEs, cash flow strongly affects working capital investment of all firms: the cash flow 
coefficient for foreign firms is 0.5, that for private firms, 0.3, and that for collective firms, 
0.6. All these coefficients are precisely determined. The cash flow elasticities evaluated at 
sample medians are 1.24, 2.35, and 3.76, respectively for foreign, private, and collective 
firms. Both these coefficients and elasticities are much higher than those in the fixed 
investment regressions. This can be explained in terms of the lower adjustment costs of 
working capital than of fixed capital
24
.  
 In Tables 4 and 5 we investigate whether having a high or a low working capital to 
fixed capital ratio affects the sensitivities of the ratios of investment in working capital and in 
fixed capital to cash flow, respectively. For state-owned enterprises, cash flow affects neither 
of the two investment types. For all other firms, the sensitivity of investment in working 
capital to cash flow is only significant for firms with high working capital (Table 4). This 
finding suggests that in the presence of a drop in cash flow, only those firms with a relatively 
high working capital will tend to adjust their working capital investment. If the level of 
working capital is high, working capital has a low marginal value and the firm is willing to 
                                                                                                                                                        
correlation in the differenced residuals allows us to discriminate between bad instruments and poor model 
specification.  
24
 In all specifications in this Table, the Sargan test indicates some problems with the specification of the model 
and/or the validity of the instruments. Yet, in the light of the arguments in footnote 22, and considering that the 
m3 test does not highlight any problems, we conclude that our instruments and specification are generally 
adequate. 
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offset negative cash flow shocks with working capital (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Carpenter 
et al., 1994)
25
.  
Table 5 shows that for private and collective firms, the sensitivity of investment in 
fixed capital to cash flow is higher for firms characterized by low working capital (the cash 
flow coefficient is respectively 0.85 and 0.42 for the two groups) compared to their 
counterparts with high working capital (for which the corresponding coefficients are 0.34 and 
0.10)
26
. For low working capital firms, the marginal value of working capital is relatively 
high, and they are consequently unable to adjust their investment in working capital in the 
presence of cash flow shocks. Hence, they need to adjust their fixed capital investment 
instead. This does not hold for foreign firms: in their case, if working capital is high, 
investment in fixed capital reacts to cash flow innovations in a similar way to private and 
collective firms (the cash flow coefficient is 0.23 for foreign firms compared to 0.34 and 
0.10, respectively for private and foreign firms). Yet, if their working capital is low, contrary 
to the private and collective firms, their cash flow coefficient is poorly determined. This 
different behavior of foreign firms can be explained by their typically much higher working 
capital to fixed capital ratio than that of private and collective firms. Specifically, foreign 
firms with relatively low working capital have an average working capital to fixed capital 
ratio of -16.5%, which compares with much lower values for those private (-46.6%) and 
collective firms (-43.3%) that are also characterized by low working capital to fixed capital 
ratios. Furthermore, low working capital foreign firms appear to be significantly less 
externally financially constrained than their private and foreign counterparts: their average 
leverage ratio (defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets), is only 58.1%, compared 
to 71.0% for private and 73.6% for collective firms. Similarly, their coverage ratio (defined 
as the ratio of net income over total interest payments) is equal to 30.1%, compared to 12.2% 
for private and 14.9% for collective firms. Their relatively good financial health may 
therefore explain why low working capital foreign firms do not adjust their fixed capital 
investment: in the presence of cash flow shocks, they are likely to be able to easily access 
external finance.  
                                                 
25
 It is interesting to note that the sensitivities of private, foreign, and collective firms‟ working capital 
investment to cash flow are higher for those observations characterized by a cash flow to fixed capital ratio 
below the firm-specific mean than for the corresponding observations above the mean. Yet there is no 
significant difference in the response of working capital investment to positive and negative cash flow shocks. 
These results are available upon request. 
26
 For both groups of firms, the difference in the cash flow coefficients across firms with relatively high and low 
working capital to fixed capital ratios is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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 In summary, our results so far suggest that in the presence of fluctuations in cash 
flow, SOEs adjust neither their investment in fixed capital nor their investment in working 
capital. As for the other firms, they adjust the latter more than the former. When 
differentiating firms into those with relatively high and low working capital, we find that it is 
only the former that are able to adjust their working capital. Furthermore, with the exception 
of foreign firms, high working capital firms exhibit lower sensitivities of fixed investment to 
cash flow than their low working capital counterparts. This suggests that in the presence of 
cash flow shocks, low working capital firms are unable to adjust their working capital and are 
forced to adjust their fixed capital investment instead. Accumulating a sufficiently high stock 
of working capital can therefore enable firms to reduce their fixed investment to cash flow 
sensitivities, so consistently maintaining fixed investment at high levels. 
 
6. Analysis of firm-level fixed/working capital investment-cash flow sensitivities 
 
6.1 Defining FKS and WKS 
The above analysis has provided one single fixed investment-cash flow sensitivity coefficient 
and one single working capital investment-cash flow sensitivity coefficient for each of our 
four ownership groups
27
. Yet, each of these groups is made up of a large number of very 
heterogeneous firms (Guariglia et al., 2011). To account for this heterogeneity, in this section 
we follow the methodology introduced by Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009) to calculate 
firm-level sensitivities of investment in both fixed and working capital to cash flow. We then 
use these firm-level sensitivities to identify the characteristics of firms with high and low 
fixed investment-cash flow sensitivities (FKS), and firms with high and low working capital-
investment sensitivities (WKS), on the one hand; and the characteristics of firms with 
different combinations of  high/low FKS/WKS, on the other.
28
 One objective of this exercise 
is to assess the extent to which these sensitivities are adequate measures of financing 
constraints. Another is to investigate whether, in the presence of cash flow shocks, firms can 
manage their working capital in such a way to alleviate the effects of financing constraints on 
                                                 
27
 In those cases in which the cash flow coefficient was differentiated across firms with high and low working 
capital to capital ratios, two fixed and working capital investment–cash flow sensitivies were provided for each 
ownership group. 
28
 The following combinations of FKS/WKS will be considered: high FKS and high WKS; low FKS and low 
WKS; high FKS and low WKS; low FKS and high WKS. 
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fixed capital investment
29
. The firm-level cash flow sensitivities of investment in fixed 
capital (FKSi) and working capital (WKSi) are respectively calculated as follows: 
 
FKSi =   
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where n is the number of annual observations for firm i, and t indicates time. These 
sensitivities are given by the difference between the cash flow weighted time-series average 
investment in fixed capital/working capital to fixed capital ratio of a firm and its simple 
arithmetic time-series average ratio
30
. These differences will be higher for firms that tend to 
display higher investment in years with relatively high cash flow and lower investment in 
years with low cash flow. Firms whose investment tracks cash flow are likely to face more 
severe financing constraints: if they suffer an adverse cash flow shock, these firms may need 
to cut their investment because they are unable to obtain external finance at a reasonable cost. 
In theory, our firm-level sensitivities can therefore be interpreted as measures of the degree of 
financing constraints faced by each of our firms. 
To see whether our sensitivities correctly identify firms, we classify firms into those 
with sensitivities above and below the third quartile of the distribution of the sensitivities of 
all firms in our sample
31
, and run our fixed investment and working capital investment 
regressions on these two sub-samples. The results are reported in Table A1 in Appendix 2. 
Panel A shows that for observations with FKS above the third quartile of the distribution, the 
coefficient associated with cash flow in the fixed investment regressions is always large and 
statistically significant. In contrast, for firms with sensitivities below the third quartile, the 
corresponding coefficient is much smaller, although still precisely determined. Focusing on 
working capital investment (Panel B), firms with WKS below the third quartile of the 
distribution always have a poorly determined cash flow coefficient, while the corresponding 
                                                 
29
 The analysis that follows is limited to foreign, private, and collective firms. We exclude SOEs considering 
that neither their investment in fixed capital nor their investment in working capital was sensitive to cash flow. 
30
 As in Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009), to avoid negative and extreme weight values, negative cash flows 
in equations (6) and (7) are set equal to zero. 
31
 This threshold level is similar to that used in Guariglia et al. (2011), who focus on the sensitivities of Chinese 
firms‟ assets growth to cash flow. Our results were robust to using a 50% cut-off point. 
17 
 
coefficient for firms with high WKS is always large and precisely determined. These findings 
confirm that our firm-level cash flow sensitivities correctly identify firms. 
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics and determinants of FKS and WKS 
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for firms with high and low FKS (Panel A) and for 
firms with high and low WKS (Panel B)
32
. Our descriptive statistics are grouped into those 
relative to variables used in the regressions reported in the previous section, those pertaining 
to working capital, general firm characteristics, financial variables, and China-specific 
variables. The last group are a dummy indicating whether the firm is located in the coastal 
area, and 0 otherwise; and a dummy indicating whether the firm is affiliated with the central 
or provincial government, and 0 otherwise. We introduce these dummies for the following 
reasons. Access to funds is likely to differ by region: firms operating in central and western 
areas may benefit from financial incentives owing to policies aimed at developing those 
regions (Goodman, 2004) whereas coastal areas may benefit from a more developed banking 
sector and the more widespread presence of foreign banks, which could make financing 
constraints less binding (Firth et al., 2009; Lin, 2010). Political connections are beneficial to 
firms, giving them “better access to key resources that are controlled by the Party and the 
government, such as business operation licenses, bank loans, land, and eligibility for 
favorable but discretionary government policies such as tax benefits and the waiver of 
“extralegal” fees” (Li et al., 2008, p. 288).  
According to Panel A, for all ownership groups, firms with low FKS typically have 
higher investment in fixed capital, as well as higher cash flow to fixed capital ratios, and 
higher sales growth than their counterparts with high FKS. They are also characterized by 
lower leverage and a lower ratio of inventories to sales, which indicates lower external 
financing needs. A higher proportion of firms with low FKS are located in the coastal region. 
These statistics suggest that low FKS firms are generally financially healthier than their high 
FKS counterparts. Focusing on fixed investment volatility, measured by the standard 
deviation of the fixed investment to fixed capital ratio, we see that, for all groups of firms, it 
is higher for high FKS firms. This is to be expected as high FKS firms typically adjust their 
fixed capital investment much more than their low FKS counterparts in response to cash flow 
shocks. 
                                                 
32
 As in section 6.1, firms with high (low) FKS/WKS are defined as those firms whose FKS/WKS falls above 
(below) the third quartile of the distribution of the FKS/WKS of all firms in our sample. 
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According to Panel B, firms with high WKS have higher working capital to fixed 
capital and working capital investment to fixed capital ratios than their counterparts with low 
WKS. It is interesting to note that the difference in the latter ratios across firms with high and 
low WKS is very strong. The respective figures are 144.9% and 91.7% for foreign firms; 
68.9% and 37.4% for private firms; and 110.5% and 58.1% for collective firms. This 
confirms that it is mainly firms with sufficiently large working capital that can afford to 
adjust their working capital investment in the presence of cash flow shocks. These huge 
differences in the working capital to fixed capital ratios are driven by the inventories to fixed 
capital ratio. The financial working capital to fixed capital ratio is in fact lower for high WKS 
private and foreign firms than for their low WKS counterparts, and it is similar for high and 
low WKS collective firms. Firms with high WKS also have higher cash flow to fixed capital 
ratios than their counterparts with low WKS. This gives the impression that they may face less 
stringent internal financing constraints
33
. Yet, they are typically smaller than their low WKS 
counterparts, and are characterized by a higher leverage and lower collateral, which suggests 
that they may be more externally financially constrained. Finally, firms with high WKS also 
have higher fixed capital investment to fixed capital ratios than their counterparts with low 
WKS. Yet, the volatility of the fixed investment to fixed capital ratios is always higher for 
firms with high WKS: those firms which make significant adjustments to their working 
capital in the presence of cash flow shocks may also need to adjust their fixed capital 
investment quite significantly.  
Table 7 reports the regression results from the ex-post analysis in which the firm-
varying FKS and WKS estimates are regressed against several proxies for financing 
constraints and other firm characteristics. Columns 1 and 2 refer to foreign firms; columns 3 
and 4 to private firms; and columns 5 and 6 to collective firms. This analysis is aimed at 
showing whether the trends illustrated in Table 6 are statistically significant. Focusing on the 
determinants of FKS (columns 1, 3, and 5), we see that, for all groups of firms, larger, older 
and slow-growing firms are more likely to display higher fixed investment-cash flow 
sensitivities. This could be the case if these firms were unable to manage their working 
capital efficiently and were therefore forced to adjust their fixed capital investment in the 
presence of cash flow shocks (Chow and Fung, 2000). Coming to the financial variables, the 
                                                 
33
 As in Guariglia (2008), we define as internally financially constrained those firms whose activities are 
constrained by the amount of internally generated funds they have at hand. Firms may also be susceptible to the 
effects of information asymmetries, which translate themselves into difficulties in obtaining external funds 
Along these lines, external financial constraints can be identified using criteria such as firms‟ size, age, leverage, 
collateral, dividend payout ratio, and so on.  
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cash flow to fixed capital ratio has a negative and significant coefficient both for private and 
foreign firms: for cash-flow-rich firms, changes in cash flow are not associated with large 
changes in fixed capital investment. Furthermore, for both private and collective firms, we 
observe a positive relationship between liquidity needs and FKS, indicating that in the 
presence of an adverse cash flow shock, those firms more in need of external finance are 
forced to reduce their fixed investment. For private firms, a similar link is observed for 
leverage. In summary, in line with the descriptive statistics in Table 6, these regressions 
suggest that higher FKS can be linked with low cash flow, high external finance needs, and 
high leverage, i.e. with a higher degree of financing constraints.  
The coefficients reported in columns 2, 4, and 6, which refer to the WKS regressions, 
show a negative sign on age and size, and a positive sign on sales growth
34
. These signs are 
exactly opposite to those in columns 1, 3, and 5 for the FKS. They suggest that larger, older, 
and slow-growing firms may be unable effectively to adjust their working capital in the 
presence of cash flow shocks, and are therefore forced to adjust their fixed capital instead. 
For all firms, the working capital to fixed capital ratio has a positive coefficient (although not 
significant for collective firms): it is mainly those firms with a high working capital stock that 
can afford to adjust their working capital in the presence of cash flow shocks. Coming to the 
financial variables, lower collateral, lower cash flow, and higher leverage are all associated 
with higher WKS: highly indebted firms with low collateral and low cash flow (i.e. those 
firms more likely to face internal and external credit constraints) are particularly active in 
adjusting their working capital. The China-specific variables do not affect any of the 
sensitivities. 
In summary, in the presence of cash flow shocks, different types of firms adjust fixed 
or working capital in different ways. Older, larger, and slow-growing firms typically adjust 
fixed capital investment, while smaller, younger, and fast-growing firms tend to adjust 
working capital instead. Furthermore, firms with low cash flow, which are likely to face 
significant internal credit constraints, are particularly active in adjusting both their working 
capital and their fixed capital investment. High leveraged firms with low collateral are more 
active in adjusting their working capital than their fixed capital investment. The question then 
arises: are financially constrained firms characterized by high WKS able to manage their 
working capital in such a way as to alleviate their financing constraints and to keep their 
                                                 
34
 Whilst the coefficient on age is significant for all groups of firms, that on size is only significant for foreign 
firms, and that on sales growth is only significant for private and foreign firms. 
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investment in fixed capital high despite fluctuations in cash flow? In the section that follows 
we attempt to answer this question by combining the two types of sensitivity.  
 
6.3 Combining FKS and WKS 
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics for the following groups of firms: firms with high FKS 
and high WKS (HH); firms with high FKS and low WKS (HL); firms with low FKS and high 
WKS (LH); and firms with low FKS and low WKS (LL). Panel A refers to foreign firms; 
panel B to private firms; and panel C to collective firms. For all ownership groups, within 
both the low and high FKS categories, firms characterized by high WKS always have higher 
fixed capital investment to fixed capital ratios than their counterparts with low WKS. Our 
explanation is that in the presence of adverse cash flow shocks, high WKS firms adjust their 
working capital in a way that enables them to keep their fixed capital investment relatively 
high. This is preliminary evidence that good working capital management can be a strategy 
enabling firms to alleviate the effects of financing constraints on fixed investment. 
Furthermore, among all ownership groups, it is the LH firms which exhibit the highest 
fixed investment to fixed capital ratios. Interestingly, fixed capital investment volatility is 
highest for the HH and lowest for the LL firms. Although their investment to fixed capital 
ratio is the highest, LH firms do not have the least volatile fixed capital investment. Even if 
they tend not to adjust their investment in fixed capital significantly in response to 
fluctuations in cash flow, it is still possible that these firms adjust it in response to changes in 
other factors such as, for instance, demand shocks. 
LH firms also display the highest (or second highest in the case of private firms) 
working capital to fixed capital ratios and working capital investment to fixed capital ratios. 
The high working capital to fixed capital ratios (which is driven by high inventories to fixed 
capital ratios) can be explained in the light of the fact that, as discussed in section 5, only 
firms with sufficiently high working capital can afford to adjust it in the presence of cash 
flow shocks. 
LH firms are the smallest and, except for collective firms, the youngest. They also 
have the highest cash flow to fixed capital ratios. Together with LL firms, they have much 
higher sales growth rates and much lower liquidity needs than the other groups of firms. Yet, 
they tend to have relatively high leverage and low collateral. Their high cash flow and low 
liquidity needs indicate that they are internally less financially constrained than firms in the 
other groups, whereas their high leverage and low collateral indicate that they are externally 
more financially constrained. In contrast, the LL firms are both internally and externally 
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financially unconstrained: they display high cash flow and collateral, low liquidity needs and 
low leverage. When a cash flow shock hits them, these firms do not need to adjust either their 
fixed or working capital investment as much as other firms. 
Table 9 reports the results of multinomial logit regressions for the determinants of 
being classified as LL (columns 1, 4, 7), HL (columns 2, 5, 8), and HH (columns 3, 6, 9) by 
comparison with LH. We set the LH firms as our baseline group because this is the group 
with highest fixed investment. Focusing on columns 1, 4, and 7, which refer respectively to 
foreign, private, and collective firms, we see that firms are more likely to be classified as LL 
as opposed to LH if they are larger, older (with the exception of collective firms), slower-
growing firms (with the exception of collective firms), characterized by a lower working 
capital to fixed capital ratio, a higher collateral, a higher cash flow (with the exception of 
private firms), a lower leverage, and (for foreign and collective firms only) higher external 
financial needs. Hence, the propensity to be classified as LH as opposed to LL is higher if 
firms are more externally and internally financially constrained (being younger, smaller, 
more indebted, less collateralized, and having lower cash flow), have high investment 
opportunities (exemplified by their high sales growth rates), and high working capital.  
Focusing respectively on columns 2, 5, and 8, on the one hand, and columns 3, 6, and 
9, on the other, we see that firms with lower cash flow to fixed capital ratios are more likely 
to be classified as HL and HH than as LH. This indicates that although they are relatively 
more internally financially constrained than LL firms, LH firms are relatively less internally 
financially constrained than HL and HH firms. Furthermore, firms with high external finance 
needs are more likely to be classified as HL than LH, and, in the case of private firms, are 
also more likely to be classified as HH than LH. Yet, despite a couple of exceptions, firms 
with lower leverage and higher collateral are more likely to be classified as HL and HH than 
as LH. Furthermore, larger, older, and slow-growing firms are also more likely to be 
classified a HL and HH than as LH. This suggests that, compared to the HL and HH groups, 
the LH firms face significant external financing constraints.  
In summary, it appears that, even though they face significant credit constraints, the 
LH firms are able to carry the highest fixed investment to fixed capital ratios. A possible 
explanation for this is that in the presence of adverse cash flow shocks, these firms are able to 
maintain high fixed investment levels by adjusting working capital more than fixed capital. 
Working capital adjustment can therefore be seen as an avenue through which financially 
constrained firms can mitigate the effects of their financial constraints, so keeping fixed 
investment smooth and high. Good working capital management may be a contributory 
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explanation of why Chinese firms, and in particular private firms, were able to invest and 
grow at phenomenal rates in the last three decades, despite being discriminated against by the 
financial system. 
 
7. Conclusions 
We have used a panel of over 120,000 Chinese firms over the period 2000-2007 to analyze 
the extent to which firms owned by different agents are able to use working capital to 
mitigate the effects of financing constraints on their fixed capital investment. We found that 
those firms characterized by high working capital display high sensitivities of investment in 
working capital to cash flow, and (with the exception of foreign firms) low sensitivities of 
investment in fixed capital to cash flow. This suggests that they are able to use working 
capital to alleviate the effects of cash flow shocks on fixed capital investment.  
We have then constructed firm-level sensitivities of investment in fixed and working 
capital to cash flow, and analyzed their determinants. We found that in the presence of 
fluctuations in cash flow, older, larger, and slow-growing firms typically adjust fixed capital 
investment, while smaller, younger, and fast growing firms tend to adjust working capital 
instead. Furthermore, firms with low cash flow, which are likely to face significant internal 
credit constraints, are particularly active in adjusting both their fixed and working capital 
investment, while highly leveraged firms with low collateral tend to adjust the latter more 
than the former. Combining the two sensitivities, we found that, compared to the other 
groups, those firms with low FKS and high WKS are more externally financially constrained 
(being younger, smaller, more indebted, and less collateralized), have high investment 
opportunities (exemplified by their high sales growth rates), and high working capital. Yet, 
they also have the highest fixed investment to fixed capital ratios. Despite the financing 
constraints that they face, in the presence of adverse cash flow shocks, these firms can 
maintain high fixed investment levels by adjusting working capital more than fixed capital. 
Good management of working capital may therefore be a means that China's many 
financially constrained firms could use to mitigate the constraints that they face. 
These findings have policy implications albeit as a second best solution, the first best 
being direct reform of the imperfect capital market. If policy-makers aim to increase firms‟ 
fixed investment by making more finance available to them, when deciding which firms to 
target, one of the factors they should take into account is the level of working capital 
available to them, as this affects the firms‟ propensity to adjust fixed capital investment. 
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Appendix 1: Data 
 
Structure of the unbalanced panel 
 
 
Number of obs. 
per firm 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
 
Percent 
 
Cumulative 
5 173,185 21.92 21.92 
6 149,382 18.90 40.82 
7 181,734 23.00 63.82 
8 285,928 36.18 100.00 
Total 790,229 100.00  
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
 
Percent 
 
Cumulative 
2000 60,341 7.64 7.64 
2001 80,055 10.13 17.77 
2002 96,159 12.17 29.93 
2003 116,442 14.74 44.67 
2004 116,053 14.69 59.36 
2005 
2006 
2007 
113,019 
107,882 
100,278 
14.30 
13.65 
12.69 
73.66 
87.31 
100.00 
Total 790,229 100.00  
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Definitions of the variables used 
 
Fixed capital stock: book value of tangible fixed assets (which include land and building; 
fixtures and fittings; and plant and vehicles).  
Fixed investment: difference between the book value of tangible fixed assets of end of year t 
and end of year t-1 adding depreciation of year t. 
Cash flow: net income plus depreciation. 
Financial working capital: working capital net of inventories.  
Current liabilities: sum of the firm‟s bank loans, accounts payable, and other current 
liabilities. 
Current assets: sum of the firm‟s inventories, accounts receivable, and other current assets.  
Inventories: finished goods and work-in-progress stocks. 
Working capital stock: difference between the firm‟s current assets and current liabilities. 
Working capital investment: difference between the working capital stock of end of year t and 
end of year t-1. 
Collateral: ratio of tangible assets to total assets. 
Leverage: ratio of current liabilities plus non-current liabilities to total assets, where current 
liabilities include bank loans, accounts payable, and other current liabilities. 
Coverage ratio: ratio of net income over total interest payments. 
Coast: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is located in the coastal area, and 0 otherwise.  
Politically affiliated: dummy equal to 1 if the firm is affiliated with the central or provincial 
government, and 0 otherwise.  
Deflators: all variables are deflated using provincial ex-factory producer price indices taken 
from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook. 
 
Appendix 2: Verifying whether our firm-level FKS and WKS correctly identify firms 
 
Table A1 reports estimates of our investment in fixed capital and working capital investment 
regressions for firms characterized by sensitivities above and below the third quartile of the 
distribution of the sensitivities of all firms in our sample. The aim of this exercise is to verify 
whether our firm-level FKS and WKS correctly identify firms. 
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Table 1: Sample means and medians (in parentheses) 
 
 
 
 
State-owned 
 
(1) 
Foreign 
 
(2) 
Private 
 
(3) 
Collective 
 
(4) 
Variables included in the main 
regressions 
 
    
Fixed investment/ fixed capital (I/K) 
 
2.18 (1.07) 
[41.92] 
{22.62; 47.01} 
{{8.79; -7.78}} 
 
9.39 (6.94) 
[43.24] 
{22.99; 46.75} 
{{17.50, -1.51}} 
 
9.78 (8.67) 
[50.68] 
{23.83; 55.32} 
{{23.86, -1.22}} 
6.17 (5.22) 
[50.78] 
{24.18; 57.02} 
{{15.58, -4.63}} 
 
Cash flow/K (CF/K) 
 
11.77 (5.26) 
[40.95] 
41.65 (22.44) 
[72.88] 
37.19 (20.05) 
[61.75] 
43.92 (21.32) 
[74.86] 
 
Investment in working capital/K (IWK/K) 
 
2.74 (0.13) 
 
17.67 (8.65) 10.92 (2.98) 12.94 (3.40) 
Working capital/K (WK/K) 
 
11.74 (-9.29) 
[178.60] 
116.74 (50.78) 
[244.34] 
56.74 (13.64) 
[196.44] 
82.93 (24.17) 
[238.0] 
 
Working capital details 
 
Working capital 
 
 
 
 
-23.83 (-5.21) 
 
 
 
110.96 (37.38) 
 
 
 
 
28.52 (4.76) 
 
 
 
19.64 (8.56) 
Inventories/K  73.93 (30.48) 127.44 (56.51) 101.22 (45.84) 111.14 (45.84) 
     
Financial working capital/K (FWK/K) 
 
-62.18 (-48.71) -10.69 (-14.48) -44.48 (-38.68) -28.21 (-28.82) 
 
General firm characteristics 
 
Assets 
 
 
 
3597.67 (315.64) 
 
 
 
1274.09 (346.61) 
 
 
 
758.10 (158.94) 
 
 
 
424.36 (156.60) 
 
Age 
 
29.17 (31.00) 
 
8.22 (8.00) 
 
9.65 (7.00) 
 
16.60 (13.00) 
 
Sales growth 
 
2.37 (4.44) 
 
11.30 (10.36) 
 
13.78 (12.40) 
 
7.93 (8.09) 
 
Financial variables 
 
Leverage 
 
 
 
 
71.26 (68.24) 
 
 
 
48.29 (47.73) 
 
 
 
59.17 (60.87) 
 
 
 
60.71 (60.91) 
Collateral 43.70 (41.96) 32.23 (29.89) 34.65 (31.74) 33.97 (30.12) 
 
Inventories/Sales 
 
576.09 (23.99) 
 
29.95 (14.68) 
 
21.82 (10.36) 
 
39.01 (10.40) 
     
 
China-specific variables 
 
Coast 
 
 
 
 
43.66 (0.00) 
 
 
 
 
94.31 (1.00) 
 
 
 
73.16 (1.00) 
 
 
 
68.77 (1.00) 
Politically affiliated 
 
 
33.34 (0.00) 3.49 (0.00) 3.68 (0.00) 2.62 (0.00) 
Observations 68,452 143,601 482,451 64,353 
 
Notes: Working capital and assets are expressed in thousands of yuan, and firm age in years. All other variables are expressed in percentage terms. Financial working 
capital is defined as the difference between the sum of cash and equivalents and accounts receivable, and the sum of short term debt and accounts payable. Coast is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm is located in the coastal area, and 0 otherwise. Politically affiliated is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is affiliated with the central or provincial 
government, and 0 otherwise. All yuan variables are deflated using provincial ex-factory producer price indices. The numbers in square brackets are standard deviations. The 
numbers in curly brackets are standard deviations of I/K for observations characterized by an I/K ratio in the upper and lower half of the distribution of all the I/K ratios in 
each ownership group. The numbers in double curly brackets are mean total assets growth rates for observations characterized by an I/K ratio in the upper and lower half of 
the distribution of all the I/K ratios in each ownership group. See Appendix 1 for definitions of all variables. 
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Table 2: Fixed investment model augmented with industry-specific time dummies 
 
 
 
 
State- 
owned 
 
(1) 
 
Foreign 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
Private 
 
 
(3) 
 
Collective 
 
 
(4) 
(Cash flow /tangible 
 fixed assets) it 
 
0.10 
(0.11) 
0.21*** 
(0.05) 
0.42*** 
(0.07) 
0.29*** 
(0.08) 
     
J (p-value) 0.99 0.02 0.11 0.20 
m1 -25.56 -37.31 -65.75 -26.44 
m3 -0.86 -0.55 -0.74 -0.77 
     
Observations 
 
52,020 105,608 336,341 47,117 
 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all 
specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments in all columns 
are (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-3), time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies. The J statistic is a test 
of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 is a test for first-order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
m3 is a test for third-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation.  Also see Notes to Table 1, and Appendix 1 for complete definitions of all variables. * indicates 
significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Working capital investment model augmented with industry-specific time 
dummies 
 
 
 
 
State- 
owned 
 
(1) 
 
Foreign 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
Private 
 
 
(3) 
 
Collective 
 
 
(4) 
(Cash flow /tangible 
 fixed assets) it 
 
0.14 
(0.34) 
0.48*** 
(0.17) 
0.35*** 
(0.14) 
0.60*** 
(0.19) 
     
J (p-value) 0.002 0.00 0.00 0.003 
m1 -22.80 -38.80 -76.89 -27.47 
m3 1.02 -0.75 1.33 -0.79 
     
Observations 
 
45,505 97,215 317,979 42,434 
 
 
Notes: See Notes to Tables 1 and 2. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: Working capital investment model augmented with industry-specific time 
dummies: differentiating firms on the basis of the level of their working capital 
 
 
 
 
State- 
owned 
 
(1) 
 
Foreign 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
Private 
 
 
(3) 
 
Collective 
 
 
(4) 
(Cash flow /tangible 
 fixed 
assets)it*LOWWKit 
 
-1.46 
(1.21) 
-0.79 
(0.53) 
0.49 
(0.40) 
0.05 
(0.34) 
(Cash flow /tangible 
 fixed 
assets)it*HIGHWKit 
 
0.08 
(0.40) 
0.59*** 
(0.18) 
0.40*** 
(0.13) 
0.75*** 
(0.18) 
     
J (p-value) 0.09 0.001 0.02 0.26 
m1 -17.31 -32.73 -65.89 -27.01 
m3 -0.75 -0.85 1.33 -0.40 
     
Observations 
 
45,505 97,215 317,979 42,434 
 
Notes: LOWWK (HIGHWK) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i‟s working capital to fixed capital ratio at time t is in the 
bottom (top) half of the distribution of the working capital of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i at time t, and 
0 otherwise. Instruments in all columns are (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-3)*LOWWKi(t-3), (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-
3)*HIGHWKi(t-3), time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies. Also see Notes to Tables 1 and 2. * 
indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 5: Fixed investment model augmented with industry-specific time dummies: 
differentiating firms on the basis of the level of their working capital 
 
 
 
 
State- 
owned 
 
(1) 
 
Foreign 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
Private 
 
 
(3) 
 
Collective 
 
 
(4) 
(Cash flow /tangible 
 fixed 
assets)it*LOWWKit 
 
0.25 
(0.27) 
-0.21 
(0.23) 
0.85*** 
(0.21) 
0.42** 
(0.18) 
(Cash flow /tangible 
 fixed 
assets)it*HIGHWKit 
 
0.073 
(0.13) 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.34*** 
(0.06) 
0.10*** 
(0.07) 
     
J (p-value) 0.97 0.09 0.04 0.02 
m1 -25.53 7.85 -46.49 -25.98 
m3 -0.83 -0.23 -0.50 -0.77 
     
Observations 
 
52,020 105,608 336,341 47,117 
 
Notes: See Notes to Tables 1, 2, and 4. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 6: Firm characteristics by firm-specific investment in fixed and working capital 
to cash flow sensitivity (FKS, WKS) types 
 
PANEL A Foreign 
 
Foreign Private Private Collective Collective 
 High  
FKS 
 
Low  
FKS 
High  
FKS 
Low  
FKS 
High  
FKS 
Low 
FKS 
Main regression 
variables 
      
I/K 9.35 
[39.31] 
10.98 
[28.25] 
9.78 
[45.16] 
13.42 
[34.74] 
8.06 
[43.98] 
9.50 
[33.72] 
CF/K 28.81 39.17 26.97 33.33 26.99 41.56 
IWK/K 12.67 15.61 7.14 6.96 5.19 11.71 
WK/K 110.70 106.42 39.93 47.06 50.64 78.05 
Working capital 
details 
      
Inventories/K 123.58 110.98 94.12 85.30 101.01 96.70 
Fin. WK/K -27.97 -7.84 -57.06 -40.60 -53.50 -21.77 
General firm 
characteristics 
      
Assets 1019.49 1242.78 680.81 684.47 357.01 404.38 
Age 8.44 7.83 10.16 8.83 17.80 15.85 
Sales growth 8.81 11.61 11.46 14.10 6.11 9.22 
Financial variables       
Leverage 50.14 47.61 61.00 58.57 64.03 59.60 
Collateral 30.85 31.66 34.27 34.18 33.55 33.28 
Inventories/Sales 22.45 19.86 19.92 15.31 23.65 17.68 
China-specific 
variables 
      
Coast 93.86 94.37 67.93 74.54 63.42 70.50 
Politically affiliated 2.43 3.03 4.09 2.99 2.43 2.34 
       
Observations 36,174 107,427 122,214 360,237 16,168 48,185 
 
PANEL B Foreign 
 
Foreign Private Private Collective Collective 
 High  
WKS 
 
Low  
WKS 
High  
WKS 
Low  
WKS 
High  
WKS 
Low 
WKS 
Main regression 
variables 
      
I/K 11.71 
[38.48] 
10.20 
[28.53] 
13.24 
[46.56] 
12.28 
[34.28] 
9.87 
[47.23] 
8.90 
[32.63] 
CF/K 41.92 34.79 35.09 30.62 41.34 36.78 
IWK/K 17.78 13.91 8.03 6.66 13.05 9.09 
WK/K 144.94 91.67 68.86 37.41 110.52 58.09 
Working capital 
details 
      
Inventories/K 164.01 97.49 118.94 77.02 135.32 85.26 
Fin. WK/K -23.40 -9.37 -53.30 -41.85 -28.40 -30.14 
General firm 
characteristics 
      
Assets 859.89 1296.03 532.14 734.08 274.54 431.93 
Age 7.72 8.07 8.81 9.72 15.98 16.46 
Sales growth 11.22 10.81 13.26 13.50 7.99 8.59 
Financial variables       
Leverage 53.96 46.33 62.45 58.09 63.66 59.72 
Collateral 24.48 33.78 28.68 36.05 26.77 35.55 
Inventories/Sales 19.88 20.72 17.60 16.09 19.09 19.21 
China-specific 
variables 
      
Coast 95.00 93.99 73.18 72.79 69.28 68.55 
Politically affiliated 2.58 2.98 3.18 3.18 2.76 2.23 
       
Observations 35,262 108,344 119,911 362,540 16,020 48,333 
 
Notes: FKS (WKS) represents the firm-specific investment in fixed (working) capital to cash flow sensitivities calculated using the 
methodology outlined in Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009). Firms with high/low FKS/WKS are defined as those firms whose FKS/WKS 
falls above (below) the third quartile of the distribution of the FKS/WKS of all firms in our sample. The numbers reported in this table are 
means, with the exception of those in square brackets, which are standard deviations. Also See Note to Table 1. 
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Table 7: Ex post regressions for FKS and WKS 
  
Foreign 
 
FKS 
(1) 
 
Foreign 
 
WKS 
(2) 
 
Private 
 
FKS 
(3) 
 
Private 
 
WKS 
(4) 
 
Collective 
 
FKS 
(5) 
 
Collective 
 
WKS 
(6) 
       
       
CF/K -0.018*** -0.041*** -0.011*** -0.017** -0.001 -0.010 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) 
WK/K 0.002* 0.009* 0.001 0.013*** -0.002 0.010 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
Age 0.224*** -0.332*** 0.052*** -0.070*** 0.080*** -0.134** 
 (0.049) (0.117) (0.011) (0.020) (0.027) (0.056) 
Log of  assets 0.449*** -1.757*** 0.367*** 0.020 0.322 -0.537 
 (0.114) (0.279) (0.078) (0.160) (0.325) (0.597) 
Sales growth -0.032*** 0.068*** -0.055*** 0.023* -0.055*** 0.025 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.006) (0.013) (0.020) (0.044) 
Leverage 0.009 0.144*** 0.014*** 0.092*** 0.020 0.079** 
 (0.008) (0.021) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.033) 
Collateral 0.004 -0.352*** -0.002 -0.136*** 0.053** -0.171*** 
 (0.015) (0.034) (0.008) (0.016) (0.023) (0.042) 
Inventories/Sales 0.010 -0.058*** 0.025*** 0.003 0.034*** -0.025 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.025) 
Coast -0.000 -0.045*** -0.006** 0.001 -0.002 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) 
Politically affiliated 0.019*** 0.010 0.005 0.019* -0.026 0.022 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.006) (0.012) (0.025) (0.037) 
       
Observations 17,339 17,339 46,132 46,132 5,497 5,497 
 
Notes: All coefficients were obtained from cross-sectional OLS regressions. Industry dummies were included in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Also see Notes to Tables 1 
and 6. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 8: Firm characteristics combining FKS and WKS  
 
Panel A: Foreign firms 
 
 High FKS;  
High WS 
 
High FKS;  
Low WKS 
Low FKS; 
High WKS 
Low FKS;  
Low WKS 
Main regression 
variables 
    
I/K 10.70 [41.93] 8.82 [38.28] 12.09 [37.11] 10.63 [25.47] 
CF/K 33.59 26.92 45.24 37.27 
IWK/K 15.24 11.65 18.79 14.62 
WK/K 135.36 86.97 148.82 93.14 
Working capital 
details 
    
Inventories/K 169.93 105.21 161.72 95.07 
Fin. WK/K -41.48 -22.61 -16.20 -5.21 
General firm 
characteristics 
    
Assets 1059.51 1004.11 781.27 1387.51 
Age 8.13 8.58 7.56 7.92 
Sales growth 9.32 8.61 11.98 11.50 
Financial 
variables 
    
Leverage 55.32 48.10 53.45 45.78 
Collateral 24.21 33.49 24.61 33.88 
Inventories/Sales 21.18 22.97 19.37 20.01 
China-specific 
variables 
    
Coast 95.06 93.41 95.00 94.17 
Politically 
affiliated 
2.50 2.41 2.62 3.16 
     
Observations 10,256 26,083 25,166 82,256 
 
Panel B: Private firms 
 
 High FKS;  
High WKS 
 
High FKS;  
Low WKS 
Low FKS; 
High WKS 
Low FKS;  
Low KFS 
Main regression 
variables 
    
I/K 10.56 [48.46] 9.51 [43.90] 14.25 [45.84] 13.16 [31.21] 
CF/K 30.29 25.67 36.88 32.20 
IWK/K 8.46 6.65 7.87 6.67 
WK/K 69.98 28.37 68.27 40.29 
Working capital 
details 
    
Inventories/K 128.40 80.87 115.10 75.80 
Fin. WK/K -61.88 -55.12 -49.95 -37.61 
General firm 
characteristics 
    
Assets 689.89 678.23 473.04 751.89 
Age 10.32 10.11 8.27 9.02 
Sales growth 11.30 11.53 14.01 14.13 
Financial 
variables 
    
Leverage 62.67 60.33 62.33 57.37 
Collateral 28.39 36.56 28.83 35.89 
Inventories/Sales 22.07 19.11 15.90 15.12 
China-specific 
variables 
    
Coast 68.69 67.62 74.87 74.44 
Politically 
affiliated 
5.04 3.74 2.93 3.00 
     
Observations 33,206 88,892 86,589 273,648 
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Panel C: Collective firms 
 
 High FKS;  
High WKS 
 
High FKS;  
Low WKS 
Low FKS; 
High WKS 
Low FKS;  
Low WKS 
Main regression 
variables 
    
I/K 9.01 [48.59] 7.72 [42.27] 10.19 [46.73] 9.28 [29.53] 
CF/K 29.73 25.98 45.64 40.24 
IWK/K 7.27 4.42 15.19 10.59 
WK/K 88.23 36.72 118.77 64.96 
Working capital 
details 
    
Inventories/K 137.12 87.64 134.66 84.50 
Fin. WK/K -52.19 -53.99 -19.59 -22.47 
General firm 
characteristics 
    
Assets 276.64 387.59 274.34 446.18 
Age 9.01 18.13 15.60 15.93 
Sales growth 5.82 6.20 8.79 9.36 
Financial 
variables 
    
Leverage 65.71 63.35 62.85 58.56 
Collateral 28.08 35.67 26.36 35.51 
Inventories/Sales 22.78 23.98 17.72 17.68 
China-specific 
variables 
    
Coast 63.76 63.19 71.23 70.27 
Politically 
affiliated 
2.14 2.49 2.94 2.15 
     
Observations 4,275 11,856 11,708 36,477 
 
Notes: The numbers reported in this table are means, with the exception of those in square brackets, which are standard 
deviations. Also See Notes to Tables 1 and 6.  
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Table 9: Multinomial logit regressions for the propensity of being classified as (Low FKS-Low WKS, LL), (High FKS - Low WKS, 
HL), and (High FKS-High WKS, HH) versus (Low FKS-High WKS, LH) 
 
 Foreign Foreign Foreign Private Private Private Collective Collective Collective 
 LL vs LH 
(1) 
HL vs LH 
(2) 
HH vs LH 
(3) 
LL vs LH 
(4) 
HL vs LH 
(5) 
HH vs LH 
(6) 
LL vs LH 
(7) 
HL vs LH 
(8) 
HH vs LH 
(9) 
          
CF/K 0.002*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.001* -0.002* -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
WK/K -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.030*** 0.077*** 0.036*** 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Log of  assets 0.253*** 0.178*** 0.083*** 0.091*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.105*** 0.091** -0.022 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.029) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.036) (0.045) (0.060) 
Sales growth -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.001* -0.006*** -0.005*** 0.000 -0.009*** -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Leverage -0.012*** -0.008*** 0.002 -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.004** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Collateral 0.033*** 0.029*** -0.009*** 0.024*** 0.022*** -0.003 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.009** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Inventories/Sales 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.000 0.000 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Coast 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001*** -0.001* -0.002*** 0.002** -0.000 -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Politically affiliated -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 0.002* -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
          
Observations 17,339 17,339 17,339 46,132 46,132 46,132 5,497 5,497 5,497 
 
Notes:  All coefficients were obtained from multinomial logit regressions. Industry dummies were included in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Also see Notes to Tables 1 
and 6.  * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table A1: Investment model augmented with industry-specific time dummies, for firms 
characterized by high/low FKS/WKS 
 
 
Panel A: FKS 
 
 Foreign 
 
Low FKS  
(1) 
Foreign 
 
High FKS 
(2) 
Private 
 
Low FKS 
(3) 
Private 
 
High FKS 
(4) 
Collective 
 
Low FKS 
(5) 
Collective 
 
High FKS 
(6) 
       
       
(Cash flow 
/tangible fixed 
assets)it 
 
0.116** 
(0.050) 
0.465*** 
(0.166) 
0.207*** 
(0.063) 
1.038*** 
(0.193) 
0.179** 
(0.079) 
0.722*** 
(0.261) 
J (p-value) 0.05 0.229 0.04 0.821 0.631 0.245 
m1 -30.68 -20.94 -57.02  -32.70 -22.05 -14.93 
m3 0.95 -2.73 -0.02 -1.39 -0.88 0.10 
       
Observations 78,721 26,887 249,522 86,819 35,081 12,036 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: WKS 
 
 Foreign 
 
Low WKS 
(1) 
Foreign 
 
High WKS 
(2) 
Private 
 
Low WKS 
(3) 
Private 
 
High WKS 
(4) 
Collective 
 
Low WKS 
(5) 
Collective 
 
High WKS 
(6) 
       
       
(Cash flow 
/tangible fixed 
assets)it 
 
0.414 
(0.330) 
0.603*** 
(0.187) 
0.201 
(0.306) 
0.602*** 
(0.136) 
0.486** 
(0.247) 
1.155*** 
(0.279) 
J (p-value) 0.048 0.004 0.507 0.131 0.457 0.006 
m1 -25.80 -23.39 -44.73 -45.88 -19.59 -17.69 
m3 -0.71 -0.26 1.51 0.78 -1.49 0.32 
       
Observations 73,714 23,501 239,648 78,331 31,986 10,448 
 
Notes: See Notes to Tables 1, 2, and 6. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
